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Abstract
From the outsourcer’s perspective, the IS outsourcing literature emphasizes the importance of
contracts and risk awareness for managing outsourcing ventures. However, there is a lack of proven
and tested outsourcing management concepts in theory and practise incorporating contractual designs
to effectively counter risk. By extending the risk model of Bahli and Rivard (2001) we investigate the
influence of risk analysis on contract quality and their interrelation with outsourcing success. Using
multiple case studies within the German banking industry our Research-In-Progress paper aims at
answering the following questions: (1) ‘How does the contract contribute to outsourcing success from
a risk mitigation perspective?’ and (2) ‘How does risk analysis affect the risk mitigation quality of the
contract?’. Our research provides insights on how the conduction of a thorough risk analysis can
improve contract quality. We show that involving business staff as well as IT staff in an outsourcing
project helps to optimize contract clauses. In addition, we demonstrate how the design of contract
contents such as pricing schemes, service level agreements, and penalty-reward-systems can ensure
the expected cost savings and thereby contribute to outsourcing success.
Keywords: Outsourcing Contract, Risk Analysis, Risk Mitigation, Outsourcing Success
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INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

The examination of outsourcing — the purchase of a good or service that was previously provided
internally (Lacity & Hirschheim 1993) — has been a domain of IS research for several years now.
When considering the potential gains that can be achieved through outsourcing most of the academic
discussions have addressed the questions of “why”, “what” and “how” to outsource (Dibbern & Goles
& Hirschheim & Jayatilaka 2004). This research focuses on “how to outsource”, especially on an
important prerequisite of a successful outsourcing deal: the design of an effective contract. The
complexity of IT outsourcing arrangements and severity of potential damages is acknowledged within
the outsourcing community (see e.g. (Earl 1996; Willcocks & Currie 1997)). Therefore, there is an
increased concern with the management of an outsourcing venture, and in particular with the issue of
risk mitigation. The most prevailing management instrument for mitigation of such risks is the
outsourcing contract (Willcocks & Kern 1998). It enables managers to diminish the effect of risk on
success. More precisely, efficient contract structures are not only beneficial to reducing the probability
of occurrence of undesirable outcomes but also contribute to loss protection (Aubert & Dussault &
Patry & Rivard 1999). The quality of the contract design heavily depends on risk analysis (Aubert &
Patry & Rivard 2002). A thorough understanding of risk, risk causes and potential negative outcomes
is an important prerequisite to set up an effective contract ensuring outsourcing success. Thus, we aim
at answering the following research questions:
Q1: How does the contract contribute to outsourcing success from a risk mitigation perspective?
Q2: How does risk analysis affect the risk mitigation quality of the contract?
To approach these research questions we first review the current literature on the role of contracts in
outsourcing relationship management and the interplay between risk (analysis) and the design of the
contract (section 2). Using these insights we develop a causal model in section 3 to illuminate causal
relations between risk, risk analysis, contract design and outsourcing success as motivated in our
research questions. Since the objective of our study is analytical generalization, we follow Yin (2003)
to use case studies for empirical validation. This Research-in-Progress Paper is part of a large multi
university research project analyzing Information Technology Outsourcing (ITO) arrangements within
the German banking industry. Preliminary results of our first interviews are presented in section 4
indicating (but so far not validating) that our causal relations seem to hold. As this paper is a
Research-in-Progress Paper, section 5 summarizes the expected contributions of our research.
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

In general, any business interaction consists of communicative and material exchanges. The contract
builds the formal basis to put these exchanges on a sound ground. According to the business
interaction model (BAT) – a six-phase model describing a generic business interaction logic – the
contract search and establishment phases as well as the contractual phase itself are important building
blocks for business interaction (Goldkuhl & Lind 2004).
As for business interaction in general, the importance of a contract in the special case of outsourcing
has been as one of several key success factors that has been stressed by various researchers (e.g. (Kern
1997) and (Kern & Willcocks 2001)). The contract can be regarded as the pivotal-point: it regulates
the venture (Kern 1997) meaning that it states the purpose of the cooperation, the obligations to be met
by the supplier, and the arbitration procedures in case of disputes (Sharma 1998). From the
outsourcer’s perspective it is important to have contractual means to mitigate risks.
The study of contractual mechanisms in IT outsourcing is still at an early stage (Aubert & Houde &
Patry & Rivard 2003). IS outsourcing studies dealing with contractual issues often incorporate a

2

broader view by dealing with all aspects of relationship management. Our research specifically deals
with two important aspects of relationship management: (1) the moderating effect of contracts on
outsourcing risk, (2) and the subsequent effect on outsourcing success, more precisely, the
achievement of outsourcing objectives.
Outsourcing risk attracts researchers (for an overview see Gewald and Hinz (2004)) and practitioners
(Gartner 2004) alike. The primary objective is to illuminate risk severity, identify risk causes and
analyze effects of risks on outsourcing success. However, throughout the outsourcing literature no
consistent definition of the risks of outsourcing has yet emerged (see the reviews in e.g. (Aubert et al.
2002)). Since the traditional quantitative evaluation of outsourcing risk is hard to perform (Bahli
2002), we use a qualitative risk definition based upon transaction cost economies and agency theory
(Barki & Rivard & Talbot 1993; Aubert & Patry & Rivard 1998): risk is a combination of risk factors
(causes) and undesirable outcomes. The risk factors represent the probability of undesirable
outcomes. When risk (or the combination of risk factors and undesirable outcomes) turns to loss,
negative consequences occur.
Risk analysis refers to activities and instruments to identify and assess risks and has been
acknowledged as an important contributor towards outsourcing success (Rao & Nam & Chaudhurry
1996). Thus, it is critical for outsourcing managers to intensively involve in risk analysis activities.
This becomes particularly present when designing contracts to effectively tackle risks (Aubert et al.
2002; Aubert & Patry & Rivard 2003). Therefore, a combined view of the activities associated with
risk identification and assessment and contract design can contribute to an enhancement of the overall
quality of an outsourcing deal.
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RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES

In this section we develop our research model. First, the underlying causal model which takes up the
three aspects introduced in section 2 (risk analysis, risk, and contract) is introduced. Then, the model’s
underlying hypotheses and constructs are described. Finally, we outline the methodology used in our
research.
3.1

Research Model

Figure 1 presents our research model as used within our case studies. Our hypotheses are reflected by
the arrows. The ‘circles’ represent the constructs. They are both described in further detail in section
3.2.

Risk
Analysis
Quality

H1 +
Contract
Quality
(Regarding Risk
Mitigation)

H3 Severity of
Risk Factors

Figure 1:

H2 +

Extend of
Undesirable
Outcomes

H4 +

Extend of
Negative
Consequences
(Loss)

Research Model
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H5 -

Achievement of
Objectives

Our model is an extension of the model of Bahli and Rivard (2001; 2003). Their model consists only
of the first three elements of the chain of causation (i.e. Risk Factor, Undesirable Outcome and
Negative Consequence). We extend this model by explicitly analysing concrete risk mitigation
contents of the outsourcing contract. This was particularly recommended by Aubert et al. (2003).
Furthermore, we add risk analysis quality as an important determinant of a sound contract. This takes
up the proposition made by Aubert et al. (2002) and Willcocks and Lacity (1999). Our ‘rear’ extension
goes back to the early discussions about risk: its proposed negative effect on outsourcing success (Earl
1996). We measure success as the achievement of outsourcing objectives to fundamentally identify the
importance of risk, risk analysis and contract design.
We propose that quality of risk analysis positively affects contract quality regarding risk mitigation.
Contract quality moderates the relationship between a risk factor and an undesirable outcome (by
doing this, we focus only on those risks which possibly could be mitigated by contract clauses). For
example, the goal of an IT outsourcing project is to reduce costs. Within a risk analysis the risk factor
‘service debasement’ has been identified as a potential threat. The severity of this risk factor can be
partially mitigated by a high quality contract in which Service Level Agreements (SLAs) combined
with a penalty system are defined. Thereby, the extent of the undesirable outcome (i.e. the actual
occurrence of a service debasement such as the breakdown of an Internet-Banking-Application for
securities trading) can be limited. This implies that the actual extend of this risk is expected to be
smaller than it would be without respective SLAs. As a consequence, the extent of the negative
consequence — i.e. the resulting loss or the amount of reparation payments the bank has to pay to its
customers — should be limited. Thus, the goal of cost reduction should not be affected to such a large
extend as it could be without an effective risk analysis resulting in a high quality contract.
3.2

Hypotheses and Constructs

Our hypotheses and constructs are based upon literature reviews and expert interviews. They are
summarized in this section. Table 1 describes our hypotheses as reflected by the arrows in Figure 1:
No. Hypothesis
H1 The quality of risk analysis positively influences the quality of the contract (regarding risk mitigation). If risks have been
thoroughly and continuously identified and assessed, this can adequately be addressed in the contract (Aubert et al.
2002).
H2 The severity of risk factors are positively associated with the extent of undesirable outcomes (Bahli et al. 2003).
H3 The impact of risk factors on undesirable outcomes is moderated by the contract quality (Bahli et al. 2001).
H4 Undesirable outcomes positively impact the extent of negative consequenes (loss) (Bahli et al. 2001).
H5 Negative consequenes negatively contribute to the achievement of outsourcing objectives (Earl 1996; Willcocks et al.
1997).

Table 1:

Hypotheses

The following Table 2 provides a brief overview of the results of the model’s construct development.
During discussions with experts it turned out that SLAs, Pricing, Liabilities and Renegotiation Clauses
were most suitable for risk mitigation purposes. Therefore, they are chosen as measures for the
construct “contract quality”. Usually, a contract consists of many other clauses which may to some
extend also be suitable for risk mitigation purposes. For an overview of all contract clauses see Kern
and Willcocks (2000).
Construct
Risk Analysis Quality

Contract Quality
(with regard to risk mitigation)
(Kern 1997; Saunders & Gebelt & Hu
1997; Kern et al. 2001)

Measures
- Identifying all risks associated with the outsourced process (Aubert et al. 2002)
- Precisely assessing risk severity (Aubert et al. 2002)
- Building and retaining human resource capabilities for risk analysis (Willcocks et al. 1999)
SLA Clauses
- Definition of penalties for not meeting the service (Beulen & Ribbers 2002)
(Lacity & Willcocks 2003) - Existence of behavior-based SLA attributes (Logan 2000)
- Basement of SLAs on business rules rather than on technical requirement
(Alborz & Seddon & Scheepers 2003)
- Existence of detailed SLAs for all services comprehending the outsourcing
deal (Domberger & Fernandez & Fiebig 2000)
- Relatedness of SLAs to pricing (i.e penalty-reward-system)
(Harris & Giunipero & Hult 1998)
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Construct
Contract Quality
(with regard to risk mitigation)
(Kern 1997; Saunders et al. 1997; Kern
et al. 2001)

Severity of Risk Factors
(Bahli et al. 2003)

Extent of undesirable outcomes
(Bahli et al. 2003)

Extent of negative consequence
(Bahli et al. 2003)
Achievement of objectives

Table 2:

Measures
Pricing Clauses
(Lacity et al. 2003)

- Application of fix or variable pricing (McFarlan & Nolan 1995)
- Existence of minimum or maximum fee (Elitzur & Wensley 1997)
- Existence of price adjustment clauses (Harris et al. 1998)
Liability Clauses
- Existence of liability clauses (Lacity et al. 2003)
(Lacity et al. 2003)
- Differentiation between willful misconduct, gross and ordinary negligence
- Relatedness of limits/amounts to the deal size
- Existence of vendor's insurance for liability issues
Renegotiation Clauses
- Existence of renegotiation options (Elitzur et al. 1997)
(Lacity et al. 2003)
- Existence of contract flexibility in the type, the level
and the quantity of service (Beulen et al. 2002)
- Possibility of early termination (Harris et al. 1998)
- Opportunism of the agent (adverse selection, moral hazard, imperfect commitment)
- Uncertainty emerging from business and/or technological changes
- Small number of service providers
- Lack of expertise of the outsourcer and/or the service provider with managing contracts
- Lack of expertise of the outsourcer and/or the service provider with the outsourced process
- Interdependence of internal and external sub-processes
- Process specificity
- Measurement problems
- Increased costs of services
- Unexpected transition and management costs
- Costly contractual amendments
- Service debasement
- Lock-in
- Disputes and litigation
- Cost escalation
- Service debasement
- Achievement of expectations within the outsourcing decision (Kern 1997; Lee et al. 1999)

Constructs and Measures

During our case study interviews we asked questions regarding each measure and hypothesis to
validate our model.
3.3

Methodology

Since the interplay of risk analysis, outsourcing contract, risk, loss and success has not been addressed
in an outsourcing context before, we perform analytical generalization. According to Yin (2003), this
implies the conduction of case studies. To achieve the necessary rigor, case studies must be prepared
and carried out thoroughly. It is important during design and preparation to explicit the research
question, propositions and unit of analysis; questions of how and why are considered appropriate (Yin
2003). The research question employed for this paper has been introduced in section 1. The
propositions used in the cases are grounded theoretically (see section 2). As unit of analysis IT
outsourcing arrangements within German banks have been chosen. The financial services sector is the
second largest buyer of outsourcing services (Gartner 2004) with increasing demand. The analyzed
deals comprise payment applications featuring a high automation level due existence of standardized
payment executions (e.g. SWIFT). Since automation and standardisation might contribute to precise
service measurement, payment applications are suitable for our research intention.
Our interview partners are IT project managers, managers of the retained organization and bank’s risk
managers. The project managers were interviewed about the original goals that were followed by the
respective outsourcing deal. In addition, IT project managers usually initiated risk analysis for contract
negotiations and thereby know the intention behind each contract clause. The risk managers and the
managers of the retained organization should provide us with details on how the contract is actually
‘working’ and whether or not the implemented risk mitigation strategies are suitable.
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PRELIMINARY RESULTS

Table 3 provides an overview of our first three cases. Interviews were conducted with IT project
managers and managers of the retained organization. Further interviews are scheduled. These deals
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represent typical outsourcing arrangements within the German Banking Industry. As all deals relate to
transaction banking results are comparable.
Bank A

Bank B

Bank C

Further Development and Maintenance
of Transaction Banking Applications

Outsourced Function
Annual Contract Volume

5-10 MM €

5-10 MM €

1-5 MM €

Number of Transactions Processed (per year)

> 1 Million
1. Cost Savings
2. Quality Improvement
High

0,5 - 1 Million
1. Cost Savings
2. Quality Improvement
High

< 0,5 Million
1. Quality Improvement
2. Cost Savings
Medium - Low

Outsourcing Objectives

Overall Satisfaction with Outsourcing Deal

Table 3:

Banking Sample

The following Table 4 presents the first results of these interviews.
Risk
Assessment

Contract
SLAs

Frequency of
Assessment

Risk Analyis Quality
Satisfaction with
Contract Design
Linkage to PenaltyReward-System
Monitoring of SLAs

Pricing Pricing Structure
Existence of Price
Adjustment Clause

Table 4:

Bank A
Monthly assessement; intensive
formal assessment prior to request
for proposal
High
High

Bank B
Monthly assessemen; intensive
assessment prior to contract
negotiations
Medium to High
High

Bank C
Irregular assessement; informal (i.e.
verbal) assessment parallel to
contract negotiations
Low
Medium

All SLAs are linked to a PenaltyReward-System

Most important SLAs are linked
to a Penalty-Reward-System

No linkage to a Penalty-RewardSystem

Permanent monitoring; fortnightly meetings between both key
account managers
Effort based
Yes, based on results of
benchmarking

Monthly monitoring; twice a year So far, no monitoring; two people
key account managers meet
were just hired to controll and
monitor the vendor
Effort based
Fix pricing
Yes, based on results of
No
benchmarking

Preliminary Results

Bank A and Bank B put a high effort in conducting risk assessments. Risk analysis is undergone on
regular basis and has been intensively carried out prior to contract negotiations. All risk assessments
have been performed by business and IT staff as well as on management level. As a consequence, all
bank staff is risk aware which directly effected contract design. Business staff urged to insert clauses
on system availability and usability to tackle risks of service debasement. IT people contributed by
providing information about SLAs to reduce the risk of unexpected costs for contract amendments.
Contrastingly, Bank C rarely conducts risk assessments. They did not implement a Penalty-RewardSystem. Currently, Bank C experiences service debasements. As no Penalty-Reward-System was setup Bank C is not able to introduce any incentives for the service provider to avoid such service
debasements. At least, they are about to hire two resources to control and monitor the service
provider’s activities. However, these resources decrease expected cost savings from external delivery
of services.
Bank A and Bank B are highly satisfied with their outsourcing contract. They both believe that all
relevant aspects are covered within their respective contract. Their SLA Frameworks are linked to a
Penalty-Reward-System meaning that the non-fulfilment of a service leads to the payment of a
reduced fee by the outsourcer. An over-fulfilment of services results in the payment of a bonus. SLAs
are controlled and discussed with the service provider on a regular basis. Within the SLA-Framework
all outsourced processes and how their accomplishment can be measured has been agreed upon. Bank
C did not implement a Penalty-Reward-System. They are currently experiencing service debasements.
As no Penalty-Reward-System was set-up Bank C is not able to introduce any incentives for the
service provider to avoid such service debasements.
Bank A and Bank B agreed upon an effort-based pricing scheme. The outsourcing contracts of Bank A
and Bank B contain a clause that allows them once a year to benchmark the prices of their service
provider with those of other service providers who deliver similar services. If prices of Bank A’s or
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Bank B’s service provider are above a certain threshold, they have the right to renegotiate fees. This
mechanism prevents them from paying excessive fees. Bank C agreed on a fix pricing. They did not
implement any price adjustment mechanisms. Therefore, Bank C is stuck to the prices they initially
negotiated. They do not have any flexibility to react to changes in demand or markets.
These first results indicate that extending the model of Bahli and Rivard (2001) by risk analysis and
contract quality and the overall effect of outsourcing success provides detailed insights that the
contract contributes to outsourcing success form a risk mitigation perspective. Further case study
interviews and analysis of results are necessary to provide detailed evidence.

5

EXPECTED CONTRIBUTIONS

This study adds value in several ways. First, it contributes to a better understanding of important
characteristics of the outsourcing contract from a risk perspective. This illuminates the concrete
relation between the contract and outsourcing success. Second, it provides insights on how a ‘good’
contract with respect to risk mitigation should be designed, that is through continuous risk analysis
performed by specialized staff.
While this study contributes to research by combining a risk perspective with contract contents, it is
also particularly relevant for practitioners. We are aware that a contract represents the results of
bilateral negotiations. However, outsourcers can benefit from our research knowing (under risk
mitigating aspects) which clauses should be especially paid attention to and what is important for
defining a clear ‘going-in-position’ when entering contract negotiations. Based on our results
practitioners can evaluate the importance of different contract clauses and the respective contents
when entering contract negotiations. Thereby, they become more aware ‘what’s worth fighting for’
during contract negotiations when an effective risk management is among the desired goals.
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